

## **Appendix for “Political Turnover and Chinese Development Cooperation”**

This appendix is not intended to appear in the published version of the article. It will be posted online on the corresponding author’s website upon publication of the article.

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## A Details of the TUFF methodology

The TUFF methodology tracks project-level data using media reports, government documents, and academic articles. The OECD's definition of Official Development Assistance, or ODA, states that it is, "i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii) each transaction of which a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)" (OECD 2017). Other Official Finance, or OOF, is defined by OECD as "official sector transactions that do not meet official development assistance (ODA) criteria" (OECD N.d.). To make Chinese data more comparable to OECD data, the TUFF methodology has introduced flow class coding to classify Chinese flows as "ODA-like", "OOF-like" based on OECD standards. As it can be hard to determine the grant element or objective of Chinese financial flows due to lack of information, a separate flow class of "Vague (Official Finance)" is also adopted for situations where the flows can be either "ODA-like" or "OOF-like". Whether Chinese aid is comparable to "Official Development Assistance" as defined by the OECD-DAC countries is debated (e.g., Bräutigam 2011a) Bräutigam (2011a) argues that most of the "aid" that China provides in Africa does not actually meet the OECD's criteria for ODA. This may raise issues when it comes to comparing the determinants or effectiveness of Chinese development cooperation with that of the traditional donors (Bräutigam 2011a, 753).

In the first stage of the Tracking Under-reported Financial Flows (TUFF) data collection method, researchers search within Factiva, a media database owned by Dow Jones, by country/year using predesigned search terms that follow a consistent pattern across recipients. Factiva curates content (mostly news articles) from 33,000 sources in 28 different languages. In addition to Factiva, researchers have also scraped the websites of Chinese embassies. Once a project is identified, it will be entered into the data management platform where it will be assigned to a different researcher for the second stage of data curation. During the second stage, researchers verify existing information as well as investigate for more details through triangulating information from media, government sources and academic publications. The triangulation minimizes the inaccuracy caused by incorrect or exaggerated reports. Moreover, the search is not only conducted in English but also in Chinese by trained Chinese-language experts and native speakers to fill the data gaps and enhance accuracy. Data recorded for each project include but not limit to recipient, year, sector, flow type, participating organization and financial amount. To eliminate errors caused by judgmental calls, researchers are also required to code the flow into "ODA-like", "OOF-like" or "Vague (Official Finance)" for every stage of data collection. When flow class is coded differently for two stages, a third researcher will be introduced to reconcile. After stage 1 and 2, a program manager will review each project for quality assurance and remove duplicates.

## B Summary statistics

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for key variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Total Chinese finance (log)	1,981	8.611	8.932	0.000	0.000	17.281	24.318
Total Chinese ODA-like finance (log)	1,981	7.078	8.312	0.000	0.000	16.177	23.133
Total Chinese OOF-like finance (log)	1,981	3.201	7.225	0	0	0	24
Total Chinese grant amounts (log)	1,981	6.015	7.650	0.000	0.000	15.128	20.560
Total Chinese loan amounts (log)	1,981	4.268	7.997	0	0	0	24
SOLS change	1,981	0.067	0.250	0	0	0	1
Other leader change	1,981	0.052	0.222	0	0	0	1
Regime change	1,806	0.027	0.163	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Civil conflict	1,981	0.141	0.348	0	0	0	1
Democracy	1,944	0.472	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
US ally	1,981	0.172	0.377	0	0	0	1
GDP (constant 2000 USD, log)	1,894	23.821	1.736	19.896	22.682	24.908	28.516
UNGA voting similarity to China	1,918	0.907	0.188	-0.767	0.920	1.000	1.000
Natural disasters	1,981	2.177	3.180	0	0	3	36
Natural resource rents	1,879	11.459	13.900	0.0003	1.680	16.171	89.166
US aid (log)	1,981	14.272	6.588	0.000	14.108	18.197	23.142
Taiwan recognition	1,981	0.107	0.309	0	0	0	1

## C Correlation matrix for independent variables


Table 3: Correlation matrix for key independent variables

	CHISOLS	Lead. change	Reg. change	Civil war	Dem.	US ally	GDP (log)	Disasters	Taiwan rec.	China voting
CHISOLS	1									
Lead. change	-0.063	1								
Reg. change	0.175	0.039	1							
Civil war	0.024	-0.017	0.069	1						
Dem.	0.152	-0.005	0.032	-0.050	1					
US ally	0.081	0.020	-0.023	-0.012	0.379	1				
GDP (log)	0.0003	-0.033	-0.048	0.252	0.038	0.195	1			
Disasters	0.016	-0.021	0.023	0.344	0.151	0.155	0.365	1		
Taiwan rec.	0.070	-0.037	-0.003	-0.075	0.132	0.397	-0.194	-0.006	1	
China voting	-0.110	-0.057	0.045	0.009	-0.359	0.061	-0.061	0.112	0.051	1

## D Maps of ODA-like and OOF-like flows

Figure 4 displays maps of Chinese investments for the projects included in our sample.

**Chinese ODA-like flows, 2000-2014**



**Chinese OOF-like flows, 2000-2014**




Figure 4: ODA-like (top) and OOF-like (bottom) flows

## E Linear probability models

In the main text we use logged financial values in our outcome variables, following Dreher et al. (2017b). Here we use as an alternative measure a dummy indicator of whether or not a country received any Chinese projects of various types during a given year. These results appear in Table 4 and mirror the results reported in the main text. Although the estimated coefficient is positive in Model 2, it is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level in a one-tailed test. Additionally, the coefficient variable on SOLS changes becomes statistically significant at the 90% confidence level in Model 4, which includes only grants in the outcome variable. Since increasing the value of projects may be more valuable to recipient leaders than increasing the number of projects, we think using financial values offers a better test of our theoretical argument.

Table 4: Domestic changes and Chinese aid, 2000-2014 (Dichotomous aid/no aid outcome)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (1)	ODA-like (2)	OOB-like (3)	Grants (4)	Loans (5)
SOLS change	0.089** (0.036)	0.056 (0.034)	0.023 (0.040)	0.072* (0.040)	0.012 (0.033)
Other leader change	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.021 (0.050)	-0.075* (0.042)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.036)
Regime change	-0.091* (0.052)	-0.063 (0.047)	-0.065 (0.053)	-0.055 (0.063)	-0.077 (0.056)
Civil conflict	0.062 (0.038)	0.069* (0.038)	-0.016 (0.053)	0.077 (0.049)	0.018 (0.048)
Democracy	-0.071** (0.034)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.049)	-0.0005 (0.042)	-0.057 (0.060)
GDP (log)	-0.151 (0.096)	-0.166* (0.094)	0.136 (0.101)	-0.101 (0.109)	0.071 (0.103)
Natural disasters	0.003 (0.007)	-0.0004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Taiwan recognition	-0.602*** (0.098)	-0.690*** (0.105)	-0.015 (0.084)	-0.493*** (0.081)	-0.132** (0.054)
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.049	0.007	0.032	0.010
F Statistic	7.559***	8.191***	1.181	5.366***	1.573

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient country in parentheses.

OLS estimates. Country, year dummies, and lagged outcome (one-year lag) included in all models.

## F Number of projects

In the main text we use logged financial values in our outcome variables, following Dreher et al. (2017b). Here we use as an alternative the logged total number Chinese projects received of various types during a given year. These results appear in Table 5. The results weaken here for Models 2 and 4, but the estimated coefficients are in the same direction of the estimates reported in the main text. Since increasing the value of projects may be more valuable to recipient leaders than increasing the number of projects, we think using financial values offers a better test of our theoretical argument, while still acknowledging the sensitivity of the result to what seems a reasonable alternative test.

Table 5: Domestic changes and Chinese projects, 2000-2014 (Logged count of projects in outcome)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance	ODA-like	OOF-like	Grants	Loans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	0.087* (0.048)	0.045 (0.042)	0.031 (0.041)	0.057 (0.049)	0.043 (0.038)
Other leader change	-0.103* (0.055)	-0.063 (0.057)	-0.082** (0.036)	-0.058 (0.048)	-0.061 (0.040)
Regime change	-0.103 (0.098)	-0.047 (0.096)	-0.038 (0.064)	0.025 (0.097)	-0.113* (0.060)
Civil conflict	0.047 (0.078)	0.056 (0.070)	-0.033 (0.054)	0.045 (0.082)	0.029 (0.049)
Democracy	-0.082 (0.073)	0.011 (0.067)	-0.092 (0.065)	0.023 (0.072)	-0.093 (0.075)
GDP (log)	-0.129 (0.148)	-0.197 (0.138)	0.178 (0.118)	-0.132 (0.129)	0.163 (0.134)
Natural disasters	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.002 (0.006)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)
Taiwan recognition	-0.823*** (0.173)	-0.894*** (0.179)	0.025 (0.086)	-0.625*** (0.179)	-0.034 (0.052)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.041	0.016	0.024	0.011
F Statistic	6.720***	7.572***	2.927***	4.298***	2.002**

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## G Excluding umbrella projects and pledges

In the main text we include umbrella projects and pledges since there may be an important signaling component of China's development commitments. Here we reestimate the main models from Table 1 to evaluate whether the results hold when we exclude these projects. These results are displayed in Table 6. Though the results weaken slightly, they are quite similar to those reported in the main text.

Table 6: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014 (umbrella projects and pledges excluded)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOB-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.223* (0.666)	0.995* (0.602)	0.285 (0.655)	0.375 (0.635)	0.453 (0.647)
Other leader change	-0.830 (0.755)	-0.178 (0.761)	-1.257** (0.546)	-0.568 (0.631)	-1.016 (0.666)
Regime change	-0.834 (1.052)	-0.134 (0.993)	-0.119 (0.856)	0.814 (0.899)	-1.485 (0.960)
Civil conflict	-0.465 (0.774)	0.306 (0.899)	-1.250* (0.725)	0.304 (0.862)	-1.030 (0.663)
Democracy	-1.983** (0.990)	-0.882 (0.837)	-1.913** (0.764)	-0.551 (0.849)	-1.132 (0.994)
GDP (log)	-0.366 (1.582)	-1.269 (1.582)	2.398* (1.300)	-1.574 (1.557)	2.816 (1.868)
Natural disasters	-0.024 (0.117)	-0.095 (0.103)	0.035 (0.082)	0.091 (0.091)	-0.098 (0.097)
Taiwan recognition	-7.558*** (1.984)	-8.762*** (2.132)	0.161 (1.352)	-6.777*** (2.212)	-0.500 (0.600)
N. countries	129	129	129	129	129
Observations	1,738	1,738	1,738	1,738	1,738
R <sup>2</sup>	0.022	0.024	0.017	0.022	0.010
F Statistic	4.008***	4.380***	3.008***	3.897***	1.767*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## H Instrumental variables results: Election years in democracies

Table 7: Election years and SOLS change, 2000-2012

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	SOLS Change (dummy)
Election year	0.204*** (0.034)
Other leader change	-0.198*** (0.053)
Regime change	0.261*** (0.070)
Civil conflict	-0.016 (0.065)
GDP (log)	-0.383** (0.193)
Natural disasters	-0.005 (0.006)
Taiwan recognition	-0.035 (0.107)
N. countries	75
Observations	719
R <sup>2</sup>	0.102
F Statistic	8.879***

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects.

Table 8: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2012 (Instrumental variable: Election year)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOF-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.712 (3.071)	1.545 (3.019)	-1.365 (3.266)	3.202 (3.046)	-0.659 (3.188)
Other leader change	-1.471 (1.063)	-0.294 (1.043)	-1.781 (1.268)	-0.318 (0.957)	-2.133* (1.179)
Regime change	-0.402 (1.746)	0.130 (1.745)	0.165 (1.990)	-0.282 (1.751)	-1.313 (1.892)
Civil conflict	1.534 (1.228)	1.637 (1.287)	1.614 (1.467)	2.130* (1.200)	1.926 (1.469)
GDP (log)	0.066 (4.307)	-1.216 (3.335)	0.522 (4.578)	-1.603 (3.270)	7.404 (4.903)
Natural disasters	-0.105 (0.153)	-0.073 (0.137)	-0.047 (0.139)	0.041 (0.115)	-0.077 (0.154)
Taiwan recognition	-7.298*** (2.186)	-8.083* (4.608)	0.761 (2.480)	-6.133* (3.211)	-2.595* (1.435)
N. countries	75	75	75	75	75
Observations	719	719	719	719	719
R <sup>2</sup>	0.030	0.029	0.007	0.018	0.017
F Statistic	2.396**	2.294**	0.013	0.423	1.292

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## I Instrumental variables results: Natural death leader exits

In this section we use instances where leaders exited office due to natural death as an instrument for SOLS changes. In the 2000-2014 period, only 16 of the 465 leaders that held power during this time exited due to natural deaths (about 3.4%). So, while we can include all countries in this analysis, we have very limited variation in the instrument. At most we would observe variation in natural death of a leader in 16 countries given the fixed-effects structure of our statistical analysis, limiting the generalizability of our findings. Nonetheless, we implement this approach here. Similar to what we observe when we use election years as an instrument, we find that natural deaths are highly correlated with SOLS change, with second-stage results that display the same direction as the coefficients in the main text but fail to achieve statistical significance.

Table 9: Natural deaths and SOLS change, 2000-2014

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	SOLS Change (dummy)
Natural death of leader	0.224*** (0.074)
Other leader change	-0.132*** (0.029)
Regime change	0.267*** (0.037)
Civil conflict	0.009 (0.027)
GDP (log)	-0.014 (0.055)
Natural disasters	-0.006 (0.004)
Taiwan recognition	0.023 (0.059)
N. countries	130
Observations	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.047
F Statistic	9.779***

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects.

Table 10: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014 (Instrumental variable: Natural death of leader)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOB-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	7.426 (8.901)	8.847 (8.810)	2.053 (7.327)	6.174 (6.097)	15.684 (11.980)
Other leader change	0.047 (1.371)	0.789 (1.311)	-1.212 (1.091)	0.131 (0.920)	0.123 (1.572)
Regime change	-3.180 (2.520)	-2.855 (2.568)	-1.079 (2.363)	-1.539 (1.832)	-5.345 (3.680)
Civil conflict	-0.081 (0.781)	0.430 (0.858)	-1.091 (0.940)	0.652 (0.830)	-0.503 (0.907)
GDP (log)	-0.713 (1.685)	-2.092 (1.615)	3.262** (1.640)	-1.849 (1.604)	2.179 (2.228)
Natural disasters	0.028 (0.125)	0.025 (0.126)	-0.022 (0.097)	0.164 (0.102)	-0.080 (0.121)
Taiwan recognition	-6.812*** (1.627)	-8.002*** (2.322)	0.342 (1.771)	-5.798** (2.310)	-1.203 (0.987)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.009	0.001
F Statistic	-4.995	-11.914	1.835*	-4.522	-43.456

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## J Pooled models

In the main text we account for unobserved country- and year-level factors with country- and year-fixed effects. However, there may be an important cross-national component to China's development behavior, and preserving cross-country variation may be instructive for the purposes of testing our theory. As shown below, the key results in Models 1 and 2 remain similar when pooling our observations and reestimating the models from Table 1 in the main text.

Table 11: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOB-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.417** (0.675)	1.269* (0.663)	-0.042 (0.703)	0.773 (0.608)	0.137 (0.632)
Other leader change	-0.750 (0.806)	-0.091 (0.803)	-1.652** (0.694)	-0.468 (0.715)	-1.811*** (0.701)
Regime change	-1.372 (1.017)	-0.781 (0.991)	-0.322 (0.933)	-0.104 (0.964)	-1.105 (1.007)
Civil conflict	0.056 (0.757)	0.599 (0.818)	-1.043 (0.911)	0.765 (0.808)	-0.220 (0.801)
Democracy	-1.156 (0.998)	-0.094 (0.729)	-1.501 (0.976)	0.414 (0.747)	-1.258 (1.243)
GDP (log)	3.501*** (0.890)	1.190 (0.800)	4.941*** (0.901)	0.562 (0.778)	5.846*** (1.152)
Natural disasters	0.0003 (0.106)	-0.022 (0.098)	-0.005 (0.089)	0.117 (0.085)	-0.151 (0.094)
Taiwan recognition	-7.364*** (1.641)	-7.951*** (2.337)	-0.137 (1.746)	-5.683** (2.230)	-1.667** (0.780)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.039	0.025	0.054	0.024	0.053
F Statistic	7.313***	4.530***	10.280***	4.330***	10.085***

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

# K Sample distribution of voting affinity with China

Figure 5: Sample distribution of UN affinity scores with China



## L Alternative measure of Chinese loans from SAIS-CARI

In the main text we use the AidData Chinese Global Official Finance data set. To consider an alternative measure of finance, we draw on the the SAIS-CARI data set of Chinese loans to Africa (Atkins et al. 2017). This data set records Chinese loans of various types to Africa throughout the period of 2000 to 2015. Recall that in the main text we find little support for the hypothesis that SOLS changes will deter less concessional forms of finance, as measured by OOF-like flows and Loans from the AidData CGOF data set. To determine whether this picture changes when we use an alternate measure of loans, we estimate one additional model where the outcome variable is the logged total of Chinese loans to a given African country during a given year. To maintain comparability with our main results and ensure differences are not due to differences in the samples (that is, the global sample versus the sample of African countries only), we re-estimate the models from Table 1 on the subset of African countries. Interestingly, the key results that we identify in the main text all become stronger in this subset of the data. Whereas the relationship between SOLS changes and grants is not statistically significant in the main text, here it is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level. The picture remains the same for Models 3 and 5, however. When we substitute the SAIS-CARI measure of Chinese loans to Africa, we do find that the direction of the predicted relationship is consistent with Hypothesis 2, but is not statistically significant.

Table 12: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014 (Africa only; SAIS-CARI measure in Model 6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOF-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)	Loans (log, SAIS-CARI)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SOLS change	4.785*** (1.136)	5.184*** (1.268)	1.462 (1.322)	3.177** (1.477)	0.438 (1.233)	-0.248 (0.271)
Other leader change	-1.578 (1.478)	-0.895 (1.727)	-2.317* (1.321)	-0.346 (1.497)	-2.620* (1.468)	-0.558 (0.388)
Regime change	-2.326 (1.511)	-1.838 (1.622)	-0.465 (1.125)	-0.457 (1.512)	-2.054 (1.509)	-0.195 (0.268)
Civil conflict	0.472 (1.043)	0.592 (1.191)	-0.739 (1.224)	1.831 (1.178)	-0.313 (1.226)	-0.242 (0.316)
Democracy	0.596 (1.256)	-0.016 (1.108)	0.771 (1.086)	0.711 (1.134)	1.218 (1.956)	-0.321 (0.375)
GDP (log)	2.608 (2.749)	2.048 (2.749)	3.593 (2.783)	-0.402 (2.873)	4.337 (3.480)	1.580* (0.871)
Natural disasters	0.054 (0.158)	-0.004 (0.182)	-0.036 (0.185)	0.173 (0.167)	-0.097 (0.168)	-0.012 (0.048)
Taiwan recognition	-7.503*** (1.930)	-8.895*** (1.973)	1.449 (1.494)	-6.437*** (2.129)	-0.014 (1.076)	-0.247 (0.391)
N. countries	50	50	50	50	50	50
Observations	683	683	683	683	683	683
R <sup>2</sup>	0.051	0.060	0.016	0.044	0.015	0.025
F Statistic	3.626***	4.345***	1.106	3.159***	1.067	1.766*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses. Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## M Pre-2009 subsample

In the main text we extended the CHISOLS data set ourselves through 2014 to allow us to test the relationship between Chinese finance and domestic turnover throughout the entire period for which data on Chinese finance is available from AidData (2000-2014) and to increase the number of observations included in our models. However, given resource constraints, we are unable to follow the exact same coding procedures in generating our extended data set.

To address this, we re-estimate our key models on the 2000-2008 sample of data, where the coding of SOLS changes and leader transitions comes entirely from the CHISOLS data set and not our own coding. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 1, though the coefficient on the SOLS change variable in Model 2 is statistically significant at only the 90% confidence level. The direction of the estimates is consistent across the two samples. The results for the Other leader change variable are no longer statistically significant, but are in the same direction. Since the latter measure is not a key part of our theory (and we found the results for that variable puzzling), we do not see this as damaging to our overall argument.

Table 13: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2008

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOB-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.863** (0.871)	1.682* (0.882)	0.349 (0.651)	0.982 (0.756)	0.443 (0.697)
Other leader change	-0.274 (0.913)	0.025 (0.867)	-0.628 (0.756)	-0.597 (0.865)	-1.045 (0.667)
Regime change	-2.214 (1.391)	-1.958 (1.285)	0.103 (1.036)	-0.723 (1.288)	-1.012 (1.179)
Civil conflict	1.347 (0.938)	1.311 (1.041)	0.827 (1.206)	1.329 (1.111)	2.084 (1.306)
Democracy	-0.792 (1.059)	0.544 (0.971)	-0.366 (1.112)	0.583 (0.947)	-1.358 (1.278)
GDP (log)	-2.770 (3.023)	-3.394 (2.997)	3.108 (2.576)	-4.468 (3.624)	-2.478 (1.696)
Natural disasters	-0.049 (0.100)	0.134 (0.100)	-0.073 (0.114)	0.184* (0.096)	-0.258** (0.120)
Taiwan recognition	-11.344*** (1.625)	-10.439*** (2.461)	-4.356 (3.333)	-9.024*** (2.673)	-4.060*** (1.521)
N. countries	128	128	128	128	128
Observations	1,015	1,015	1,015	1,015	1,015
R <sup>2</sup>	0.033	0.036	0.011	0.029	0.018
F Statistic	3.281***	3.612***	1.041	2.926***	1.790*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## N Collapsing SOLS changes and other leader changes

Table 14: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOF-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any leader change	0.669 (0.546)	0.794 (0.521)	-0.555 (0.526)	0.319 (0.491)	-0.476 (0.542)
Regime change	-1.447 (1.025)	-0.786 (0.961)	-0.397 (0.963)	-0.023 (0.943)	-1.146 (1.022)
Civil conflict	-0.098 (0.739)	0.502 (0.804)	-1.166 (0.935)	0.697 (0.802)	-0.410 (0.820)
Democracy	-1.141 (1.000)	-0.092 (0.746)	-1.465 (0.978)	0.417 (0.766)	-1.229 (1.222)
GDP (log)	-0.740 (1.719)	-2.117 (1.618)	3.359** (1.690)	-1.825 (1.586)	1.902 (2.048)
Natural disasters	-0.005 (0.119)	-0.018 (0.107)	-0.032 (0.095)	0.132 (0.094)	-0.162 (0.099)
Taiwan recognition	-6.849*** (1.610)	-7.596*** (2.318)	0.164 (1.737)	-5.434** (2.210)	-1.067 (0.757)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.020	0.016	0.020	0.008
F Statistic	3.255***	4.058***	3.312***	4.168***	1.529

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## O Including lagged and lead versions of SOLS change variable

Table 15: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOB-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.694** (0.704)	1.595** (0.690)	-0.024 (0.730)	0.852 (0.640)	0.303 (0.659)
SOLS change (1-year lag)	0.871 (0.614)	0.980 (0.643)	-0.468 (0.521)	0.570 (0.589)	-0.108 (0.581)
SOLS change (1-year lead)	0.598 (0.692)	0.449 (0.629)	-0.444 (0.559)	-0.027 (0.593)	-0.605 (0.660)
Other leader change	-0.748 (0.790)	-0.115 (0.753)	-1.504** (0.685)	-0.285 (0.698)	-1.529** (0.702)
Regime change	-1.186 (1.138)	-0.627 (1.065)	-0.409 (1.064)	0.448 (0.995)	-1.272 (1.163)
Civil conflict	0.016 (0.768)	0.294 (0.867)	-0.915 (1.043)	0.793 (0.843)	-0.114 (0.879)
Democracy	-1.056 (1.069)	-0.114 (0.757)	-1.628 (1.034)	0.068 (0.764)	-1.261 (1.246)
GDP (log)	-1.136 (1.741)	-2.579 (1.690)	3.546* (1.890)	-2.634 (1.715)	1.965 (2.073)
Natural disasters	0.009 (0.134)	0.034 (0.120)	-0.024 (0.104)	0.165 (0.106)	-0.160 (0.101)
Taiwan recognition	-7.831*** (1.319)	-8.248*** (2.113)	-0.158 (1.966)	-5.781*** (2.096)	-1.790** (0.804)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,626	1,626	1,626	1,626	1,626
R <sup>2</sup>	0.022	0.026	0.018	0.023	0.010
F Statistic	3.002***	3.587***	2.520***	3.084***	1.336

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.

## P Controlling for Taiwan de-recognition period

Table 16: Domestic changes and Chinese finance, 2000-2014

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	All finance (log)	ODA-like (log)	OOF-like (log)	Grants (log)	Loans (log)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SOLS change	1.638** (0.650)	1.398** (0.646)	0.136 (0.693)	0.875 (0.606)	0.403 (0.641)
Other leader change	-0.667 (0.797)	-0.055 (0.784)	-1.489** (0.672)	-0.479 (0.718)	-1.648** (0.707)
Regime change	-1.658 (1.038)	-0.926 (0.991)	-0.537 (0.944)	-0.162 (0.959)	-1.315 (1.048)
Civil conflict	-0.032 (0.730)	0.587 (0.789)	-1.167 (0.919)	0.819 (0.777)	-0.456 (0.803)
Democracy	-1.218 (0.996)	-0.191 (0.737)	-1.466 (0.983)	0.279 (0.757)	-1.179 (1.214)
GDP (log)	-0.791 (1.723)	-2.095 (1.621)	3.263* (1.681)	-1.756 (1.593)	1.725 (2.042)
Natural disasters	-0.0002 (0.119)	-0.008 (0.108)	-0.035 (0.094)	0.147 (0.096)	-0.173* (0.098)
Taiwan recognition	-7.180*** (1.810)	-9.088*** (2.037)	1.280 (1.934)	-7.941*** (2.422)	1.617 (1.279)
Taiwan derecognition honeymoon	-0.409 (1.035)	-2.090* (1.240)	1.656 (1.208)	-3.578** (1.597)	3.928** (1.588)
N. countries	130	130	130	130	130
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.023	0.019	0.025	0.014
F Statistic	3.143***	3.695***	3.075***	4.173***	2.188**

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors clustered by recipient in parentheses.

Country- and year-fixed effects, lagged outcome (one-year) included in all models.