

Online Appendix for “International Constraints, Political Turnover, and Voting Consistency in the United Nations General Assembly”

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A Summary statistics for key variables

Table 1 displays summary statistics for the key variables in our data set.

Table 1: Summary statistics for key variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
logvotech	7,103	-2.661	1.206	-9.944	0.607
solsch	8,120	0.086	0.281	0	1
n_defenders	8,120	9.004	10.647	0	52
n_rivals	8,120	0.748	1.136	0	7
totaligos_impute	7,373	44.652	21.713	0.000	129.000
ln_total_budget_support	7,712	4.663	7.727	0.000	24.740
fdi_pct_gdp	4,824	2.320	5.346	-28.624	161.824
trade_pct_gdp	5,296	65.741	42.882	0.021	425.363
state_capacity	6,153	0.989	0.392	0.025	3.305
othldrtrans	8,120	0.091	0.287	0	1
demboth	7,953	0.379	0.485	0.000	1.000
gdp_per_capita	7,512	1.647	0.917	0.125	6.451
ln_population	7,512	9.038	1.513	4.781	14.077
regtrans	8,120	0.023	0.148	0	1
CWend	8,120	0.054	0.226	0	1
USally	8,120	0.319	0.466	0	1
USSRally	8,120	0.061	0.240	0	1

B Description of analysis data from Mattes, Leeds and Carroll (2015)

The following excerpt of Mattes, Leeds and Carroll 2015, 284 provides a description of the domain and coding of the baseline analysis data set to which we append additional variables:

To test our hypotheses, we take advantage of countries' yearly voting records in the UNGA between 1946 and 2008. Using the country-year as the unit of analysis allows us to contrast years in which a new leader with a different source of societal support comes to power, years in which there is a leader change but the new leader represents the same segment of society as her predecessor, and years in which there is no leadership transition. We expect that, on average, UNGA voting change is most likely to be observed in years in which a new leader with a different supporting coalition assumes office. We identify the leaders in office each year using the Archigos data, version 2.9 (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009). Since voting in the UNGA typically occurs late in the year, the country's voting record in leader transition years is attributed to the new leader rather than her predecessor. The exceptions are leader transitions that occur in the month of December. In the case of December leader transitions, we attribute the country's voting record in that year to the leader in power before December 1st. If there are multiple leader transitions in a given year, we code the leader in power during November as the leader in charge of the country's voting in that year.

Because we are interested in the change in the state's ideal point from the previous year, data from the first UNGA session for each state during our observation period are not included in the analysis. We also drop state- years in which the country did not vote in the UNGA. Finally, we exclude years with interim leaders who do not represent any particular societal groups but rather are tasked with maintaining the status quo until a new regular leader takes office. This leaves us with 7,049 state-years.

C Subset of non-democratic country years

Table 2: International context, domestic turnover, and foreign policy change in non-democracies

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Defense Pacts	Rivalries	Capacity	Change in UNGA Ideal Point IGO Memberships	Trade	Aid	FDI / GDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SOLS Change	0.297*** (0.115)	0.320*** (0.104)	0.198 (0.225)	0.613** (0.250)	0.338* (0.199)	0.342*** (0.104)	0.387*** (0.120)
No. Defenders	-0.009 (0.006)						
No. Rivals		0.067** (0.034)					
State Capacity			-0.091 (0.082)				
Total IGO Memberships				-0.009*** (0.003)			
Trade (pct. GDP)					-0.002* (0.001)		
Aid (log)						-0.005 (0.003)	
FDI/GDP							-0.004 (0.005)
GDP per capita	0.060 (0.066)	0.070 (0.066)	-0.077 (0.075)	0.132* (0.072)	-0.049 (0.094)	0.060 (0.066)	0.037 (0.092)
Population (log)	-0.383*** (0.065)	-0.434*** (0.057)	-0.476*** (0.066)	-0.066 (0.128)	-0.604*** (0.083)	-0.376*** (0.064)	-0.338*** (0.091)
Cold War End	0.066 (0.080)	0.059 (0.080)	-0.030 (0.084)	0.074 (0.081)	0.053 (0.089)	0.069 (0.081)	0.017 (0.085)
US Ally	0.312* (0.184)	0.304* (0.182)	0.396 (0.241)	0.390** (0.194)	0.304 (0.256)	0.266 (0.181)	0.423 (0.319)
USSR Ally	-0.377 (0.280)	-0.449 (0.278)	0.609 (0.441)	-0.415 (0.279)	0.543 (0.438)	-0.455 (0.278)	0.907 (0.679)
SOLS Change × No. Defenders	-0.003 (0.009)						
SOLS Change × No. Rivals		-0.048 (0.071)					
SOLS Change × State Capacity			0.029 (0.231)				
SOLS Change × No. IGOs				-0.007 (0.006)			
SOLS Change × Trade (pct. GDP)					-0.001 (0.003)		
SOLS Change × Aid						-0.012 (0.011)	
SOLS Change × FDI/GDP							-0.015 (0.023)
Observations	4,043	4,043	3,148	3,796	2,686	4,043	2,463
R ²	0.836	0.837	0.847	0.838	0.850	0.836	0.856
Adjusted R ²	0.831	0.831	0.841	0.832	0.843	0.831	0.848
Residual Std. Error	1.175	1.174	1.143	1.178	1.131	1.175	1.141
F Statistic	147.958***	148.109***	138.153***	141.663***	120.296***	148.047***	112.898***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

OLS estimates. Country dummies included in all models.

D Subset of democratic country years

Table 3: International context, domestic turnover, and foreign policy change in democracies

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Change in UNGA Ideal Point						
	Defense Pacts (1)	Rivalries (2)	Capacity (3)	IGO Memberships (4)	Trade (5)	Aid (6)	FDI / GDP (7)
SOLS Change	0.181** (0.092)	0.143* (0.075)	0.186 (0.223)	0.026 (0.203)	0.032 (0.146)	0.218*** (0.079)	0.227*** (0.085)
No. Defenders	-0.009 (0.006)						
No. Rivals		0.001 (0.083)					
State Capacity			0.317** (0.148)				
Total IGO Memberships				-0.014*** (0.003)			
Trade (pct. GDP)					-0.005** (0.002)		
Aid (log)						-0.002 (0.004)	
FDI/GDP							-0.0004 (0.007)
GDP per capita	-0.565*** (0.083)	-0.564*** (0.083)	-0.547*** (0.096)	-0.240** (0.109)	-0.555*** (0.122)	-0.572*** (0.084)	-0.593*** (0.131)
Population (log)	-0.626*** (0.132)	-0.696*** (0.122)	-0.958*** (0.147)	-0.381** (0.158)	-0.885*** (0.161)	-0.669*** (0.132)	-0.938*** (0.201)
Cold War End	0.266*** (0.098)	0.262*** (0.098)	0.222** (0.098)	0.282*** (0.097)	0.226** (0.101)	0.273*** (0.098)	0.236** (0.099)
US Ally	-0.237 (0.146)	-0.281** (0.143)	-0.254* (0.145)	-0.109 (0.156)	-0.230 (0.159)	-0.289** (0.142)	-0.254 (0.160)
USSR Ally	0.432* (0.233)	0.433* (0.233)	0.053 (0.347)	0.162 (0.238)	0.355 (0.340)	0.425* (0.233)	0.424 (0.328)
SOLS Change × No. Defenders	-0.001 (0.005)						
SOLS Change × No. Rivals		0.043 (0.070)					
SOLS Change × State Capacity			-0.024 (0.206)				
SOLS Change × No. IGOs				0.002 (0.003)			
SOLS Change × Trade (pct. GDP)					0.002 (0.002)		
SOLS Change × Aid						-0.009 (0.008)	
SOLS Change × FDI/GDP							-0.012 (0.020)
Observations	2,707	2,707	2,434	2,578	2,219	2,707	2,138
R ²	0.869	0.869	0.877	0.873	0.878	0.869	0.880
Adjusted R ²	0.863	0.862	0.870	0.866	0.871	0.863	0.874
Residual Std. Error	1.134	1.135	1.121	1.122	1.124	1.134	1.126
F Statistic	139.098***	138.954***	138.206***	141.421***	130.539***	139.066***	128.317***

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

OLS estimates. Country dummies included in all models.

E Output for three-way interaction model

Table 4: Output for three-way interaction models

	Dependent variable:						
	logvotetech						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
solsch	0.322*** (0.107)	0.341*** (0.099)	0.151 (0.204)	0.672*** (0.225)	0.456*** (0.168)	0.389*** (0.098)	0.433*** (0.114)
n_defenders	-0.010** (0.005)						
n_rivals		0.044 (0.031)					
state_capacity			-0.063 (0.077)				
total_igos_impute				-0.007*** (0.002)			
trade_pct_gdp					-0.002 (0.001)		
ln_total_budget_support						-0.002 (0.003)	
fdi_pct_gdp							-0.003 (0.005)
demboth	-0.047 (0.076)	-0.112* (0.064)	-0.404*** (0.144)	0.642*** (0.128)	0.149 (0.109)	-0.116* (0.067)	-0.158** (0.070)
gdp_per_capita	-0.241*** (0.047)	-0.244*** (0.047)	-0.323*** (0.055)	0.034 (0.057)	-0.295*** (0.069)	-0.252*** (0.047)	-0.239*** (0.071)
ln_population	-0.439*** (0.053)	-0.521*** (0.047)	-0.600*** (0.056)	-0.135 (0.087)	-0.701*** (0.067)	-0.485*** (0.052)	-0.538*** (0.077)
regtrans	0.109 (0.114)	0.103 (0.114)	0.029 (0.123)	0.100 (0.122)	0.016 (0.125)	0.118 (0.115)	-0.037 (0.133)
CWend	0.166*** (0.062)	0.157** (0.062)	0.071 (0.064)	0.177*** (0.062)	0.135** (0.067)	0.164*** (0.062)	0.110* (0.065)
USally	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.182* (0.103)	-0.260** (0.116)	0.022 (0.111)	-0.224* (0.125)	-0.192* (0.103)	-0.244* (0.132)
USSRally	0.051 (0.134)	-0.026 (0.132)	0.313 (0.275)	-0.097 (0.132)	0.344 (0.215)	-0.053 (0.131)	0.452** (0.230)
solsch:n_defenders	-0.003 (0.007)						
solsch:n_rivals		-0.044 (0.065)					
solsch:state_capacity			0.118 (0.207)				
solsch:total_igos_impute				-0.008 (0.005)			
solsch:trade_pct_gdp					-0.003 (0.003)		
solsch:ln_total_budget_support						-0.015* (0.009)	
solsch:fdi_pct_gdp							-0.025 (0.023)
solsch:demboth	-0.231 (0.146)	-0.256** (0.128)	-0.115 (0.327)	-0.873*** (0.317)	-0.606** (0.238)	-0.249* (0.130)	-0.300** (0.147)
n_defenders:demboth	-0.005 (0.004)						
n_rivals:demboth		-0.031 (0.061)					
state_capacity:demboth			0.298** (0.143)				
total_igos_impute:demboth				-0.014*** (0.002)			
trade_pct_gdp:demboth					-0.003** (0.001)		
ln_total_budget_support:demboth						-0.001 (0.005)	
fdi_pct_gdp:demboth							-0.007 (0.008)
solsch:n_defenders:demboth	0.002 (0.009)						
solsch:n_rivals:demboth		0.057 (0.101)					
solsch:state_capacity:demboth			-0.061 (0.311)				
solsch:total_igos_impute:demboth				0.013** (0.006)			
solsch:trade_pct_gdp:demboth					0.007* (0.003)		
solsch:ln_total_budget_support:demboth						0.007 (0.013)	
solsch:fdi_pct_gdp:demboth							0.026 (0.031)
Observations	6,750	6,750	5,582	6,374	4,905	6,750	4,601
R ²	0.846	0.846	0.857	0.850	0.860	0.846	0.864
Adjusted R ²	0.842	0.842	0.853	0.846	0.855	0.842	0.859

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F Correlation matrix for key conditioning variables

Table 5 displays correlations between the key conditioning variables in our analysis.

Table 5: Correlations between key conditioning variables

	No. Defenders	No. Rivals	State Capacity	Total IGO Memberships	Aid (log)	FDI/GDP	Trade (pct. GDP)
No. Defenders	1	0.061	-0.044	0.390	0.077	-0.002	-0.106
No. Rivals	0.061	1	0.048	-0.093	-0.031	-0.072	-0.170
State Capacity	-0.044	0.048	1	0.050	-0.052	-0.071	0.046
Total IGO Memberships	0.390	-0.093	0.050	1	0.181	0.070	-0.049
Aid (log)	0.077	-0.031	-0.052	0.181	1	0.005	-0.003
FDI/GDP	-0.002	-0.072	-0.071	0.070	0.005	1	0.378
Trade (pct. GDP)	-0.106	-0.170	0.046	-0.049	-0.003	0.378	1

G Additional measures of capacity

In the main text, we use a composite measure of capacity developed by Arbetman and Kugler (2018). Here we consider three alternative measures of capacity. Another approach to measuring capacity is using GDP per capita, population, and aid as a percent of GDP, as done by Brazys and Panke (2017). As noted in the main text, they find that these variables are important predictors of voting consistency, and we included two of them on the basis that they might confound the relationship between domestic change and voting consistency. We considered the conditioning effects of aid in the main text, but here we consider the other two variables as conditioning factors. Table 6 presents the results of statistical models that include measure for real GDP per capita (logged) and population (logged) from Gleditsch (2002) on their own and interacted with the SOLS change variable. We also construct a measure of aid as a percent of GDP by dividing our measure of aid by Gleditsch's (2002) measure of real GDP. In the models without the interaction terms (Models 1-4), the effect of SOLS changes remains positive and statistically significant. In columns 4 and 5 we interact these measures with SOLS changes. The coefficient for the multiplicative interaction term is not statistically significant for any of the models. The base coefficient for SOLS changes is only statistically significant in Model 7, though it is important to remember that this coefficient now refers to the estimated marginal effect of SOLS changes when the conditioning variables are at zero. To get a better sense of the direction and statistical significance of the SOLS change variable, we calculate marginal effects and present them in plots as in the main text. These results are displayed in the three panels in Figure 1. Here we can see that effect of SOLS changes remains positive and tends to be statistically distinguishable from zero for much of the typical range of variation for each conditioning variable. However, similar to what we find in the main analysis, we do see the effect of SOLS changes trend toward zero when we consider Aid / GDP as a conditioning variable. Again, though, this change in the estimated coefficient is itself not statistically significant.

Table 6: Alternative measures of capacity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Change in UNGA Ideal Point						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SOLS Change	0.194*** (0.055)	0.175*** (0.055)	0.180*** (0.055)	0.182*** (0.054)	0.195 (0.119)	0.272 (0.326)	0.224*** (0.064)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.370*** (0.046)			-0.254*** (0.047)	-0.368*** (0.047)		
Population (log)		-0.579*** (0.046)		-0.501*** (0.051)		-0.578*** (0.046)	
Aid / GDP (log)			-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)			-0.024*** (0.005)
Democracy	-0.303*** (0.053)	-0.184*** (0.054)	-0.295*** (0.054)	-0.156*** (0.054)	-0.303*** (0.053)	-0.183*** (0.054)	-0.294*** (0.054)
Regime Transition	0.073 (0.108)	0.170 (0.108)	0.096 (0.109)	0.169 (0.108)	0.073 (0.110)	0.173 (0.108)	0.106 (0.109)
Cold War End	0.089 (0.062)	0.153** (0.062)	0.112* (0.063)	0.165*** (0.062)	0.089 (0.062)	0.154** (0.062)	0.111* (0.063)
US Ally	-0.085 (0.104)	-0.207** (0.103)	-0.111 (0.104)	-0.182* (0.103)	-0.085 (0.104)	-0.208** (0.103)	-0.115 (0.104)
USSR Ally	-0.075 (0.132)	0.067 (0.129)	0.069 (0.131)	-0.052 (0.131)	-0.075 (0.132)	0.068 (0.129)	0.066 (0.131)
SOLS Change × GDP per capita (log)					-0.001 (0.059)		
SOLS Change × Population (log)						-0.011 (0.035)	
SOLS Change × Aid / GDP (log)							-0.020 (0.014)
Observations	6,750	6,750	6,750	6,750	6,750	6,750	6,750
R ²	0.843	0.845	0.842	0.846	0.843	0.845	0.842
Adjusted R ²	0.839	0.841	0.838	0.842	0.839	0.841	0.838
Residual Std. Error	1.180	1.172	1.183	1.169	1.180	1.172	1.183
F Statistic	206.228***	209.758***	204.895***	208.354***	203.789***	207.274***	202.538***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

OLS estimates. Country dummies included in all models.




Figure 1: Alternative measures of capacity

H Principal components analysis of seven conditioning factors

In the main text we analysis the various potential international constraints separately since each of the theoretical arguments we review imply that those constraints should alone be sufficient to mute the effect of domestic change on UN voting. Here we conduct a principal components analysis where we estimate an underlying dimension common to the seven conditioning factors as a way of summarizing their overall effects as a constraint on foreign policy. To do this, we use the `prcomp()` function in R on the subset of cases for which data is non-missing for the seven constraining variables. We take the first principal component for use in our analysis, which Figure 2 shows explains about 20% of the variance in the data.




Figure 2: Proportion of variance explained by principal components

We present the results of this analysis in Table 7. As expected, the constraint score on its own is negatively associated with foreign policy change. However, as evident by the near-zero and statistically insignificant interaction term between SOLS changes and the constraint dimension, and by the marginal effects plotted in Figure 3, this constraint dimension does not moderate the impact of SOLS changes on foreign policy change. The coefficient for SOLS changes is not statistically significant in the table, though that estimate applies when the constraint score is zero. Figure 3 shows that the effect of a SOLS change remains positive and statistically significant for much of the typical range of variation for the constraint score.

Table 7: First principal component (constraint score)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Change in UNGA Ideal Point
SOLS Change	0.188 (0.157)
Constraint score	-0.007** (0.003)
Other Leader Transition	0.309* (0.161)
Democracy	-0.136* (0.072)
GDP per capita	-0.250*** (0.080)
Population (log)	-0.559*** (0.091)
Regime Transition	0.034 (0.133)
Cold War End	0.098 (0.069)
US Ally	-0.174 (0.140)
USSR Ally	0.148 (0.357)
SOLS Change \times Constraint score	0.001 (0.004)
Other Leader Transition \times Constraint score	-0.004 (0.004)
Observations	4,144
R ²	0.866
Adjusted R ²	0.860
Residual Std. Error	1.144
F Statistic	160.606***

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

OLS estimates. Country dummies included in all models.




Figure 3: Principal components analysis

I Simultaneously controlling for and interacting seven conditioning factors

In the main text we introduce each of the conditioning variables on their own to simplify the interpretation of the results. Here, we control for every conditioning factor simultaneously along with its interaction with the SOLS change variable. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8. Overall the results are similar to the results reported in the main text. One exception is that the conditioning effect of aid on SOLS changes becomes statistically significant as shown by the coefficient on the interaction between SOLS changes and foreign aid.

The process of calculating the marginal effect of SOLS changes across the range of a conditioning variable is more complicated for this model since the effect is no longer just a function of the value of a particular conditioning variable, but a function of the values of all the other conditioning variables. To interpret the marginal effects of SOLS changes across each conditioning variable, we hold all the other conditioning factors at their means. We calculate confidence intervals using the same simulation methods that we use for the three-way interaction analysis in the main text. The results of this analysis are displayed in the seven panels of Figure 4. On the whole the results look fairly similar to the main text. However, this model is estimated on a smaller sample due to the loss of observations from missingness across all seven variables, so any changes in our conclusions may be partially due to the different samples used.

Table 8: Including conditioning factors simultaneously

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Change in UNGA Ideal Point	
SOLS Change	0.209	(0.296)
Defensive allies	-0.010*	(0.005)
Rivals	0.001	(0.046)
IGOs	-0.015***	(0.003)
Aid	0.004	(0.003)
FDI	0.001	(0.005)
Trade	-0.001	(0.001)
Capacity	0.036	(0.094)
Democracy	-0.092	(0.074)
GDP per capita	-0.081	(0.088)
Population (log)	0.119	(0.157)
Regime Transition	0.069	(0.134)
Cold War End	0.111	(0.070)
US Ally	-0.001	(0.145)
USSR Ally	-0.282	(0.367)
SOLS Change \times Defensive allies	-0.001	(0.005)
SOLS Change \times Rivals	0.026	(0.067)
SOLS Change \times IGOs	-0.001	(0.003)
SOLS Change \times Aid	-0.014**	(0.007)
SOLS Change \times FDI	-0.016	(0.018)
SOLS Change \times Trade	0.002	(0.002)
SOLS Change \times Capacity	0.105	(0.183)
Observations	4,144	
R ²	0.867	
Adjusted R ²	0.862	
Residual Std. Error	1.139	
F Statistic	145.824***	

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Two-tailed tests. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
OLS estimates. Country dummies included in all models.




Figure 4: Interacting all conditioning factors with SOLS changes simultaneously

J Additional three-way interaction figure results: population




Figure 5: Interacting conditioning factors and population size

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