

Supplementary Files for “Term Limits and Environmental Treaty Commitments”

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A Effects of GDP per capita conditional on term limits




Figure 3: Effects of GDP per capita conditional on term limits

B Testing conditional effects of leader age

Table 4: Term limits, age, and environmental treaty participation, 1970-2011

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>OLS</i> MEAs (1)	<i>Poisson</i> MEAs (2)	<i>OLS</i> MEAs + BEAs (3)	<i>Poisson</i> MEAs + BEAs (4)
Term limit	−1.625** (0.821)	−0.106 (0.109)	−2.083** (0.921)	−0.232* (0.124)
Real GDP/capita (log)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.006)	−0.0003 (0.001)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	−0.437* (0.237)	−0.039 (0.035)	−0.619** (0.270)	−0.064 (0.040)
Experience with democracy	0.003 (0.003)	0.00000 (0.0004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	−0.029 (0.023)	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.053** (0.026)	−0.007* (0.004)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	−0.103* (0.056)	−0.016** (0.007)	−0.206** (0.095)	−0.028*** (0.010)
XRCOMP	0.055*** (0.015)	0.005** (0.002)	0.060*** (0.017)	0.006** (0.003)
PARCOMP	0.320* (0.180)	0.038 (0.026)	0.347* (0.200)	0.036 (0.027)
IGO memberships	−0.112 (0.094)	−0.028** (0.014)	−0.184* (0.107)	−0.036** (0.015)
Executive right	0.005 (0.010)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.007 (0.012)	−0.002* (0.001)
Executive left	0.050 (0.126)	0.008 (0.015)	−0.049 (0.157)	−0.002 (0.017)
CSO repression	0.097 (0.124)	−0.002 (0.015)	0.018 (0.154)	−0.015 (0.018)
Presidential democracy?	0.099 (0.085)	0.025** (0.013)	0.133 (0.103)	0.035** (0.014)
Leader age	0.014 (0.110)	0.004 (0.013)	−0.107 (0.137)	−0.013 (0.016)
Female	−0.258 (0.188)	−0.011 (0.023)	−0.394 (0.256)	−0.011 (0.027)
Term limit × Leader age	0.023* (0.014)	0.001 (0.002)	0.030* (0.016)	0.003 (0.002)
Observations	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274
R ²	0.969		0.959	
Adjusted R ²	0.966		0.956	
Log Likelihood		−4,737.289		−5,001.023
Akaike Inf. Crit.		9,792.577		10,320.050

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.




Figure 4: Effects of term limits conditional on leader age

C Alternate dependent variable: Climate treaties

Table 5: Term limits and climate IEAs, 1992-2011

	DV: Climate IEAs signed	
	<i>OLS</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.016)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.010* (0.005)	0.046 (0.032)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.006)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
XRCOMP	0.009 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
PARCOMP	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.014 (0.009)
IGO memberships	0.00001 (0.0003)	0.002** (0.001)
Executive right	0.003 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.013)
Executive left	0.003 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.013)
CSO repression	0.0001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.013)
Presidential democracy?	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.011)
Leader age	-0.001 (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.001)
Female	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.028 (0.023)
Country dummies?	N	Y
Observations	1,600	1,600
R ²	0.928	0.932
Adjusted R ²	0.926	0.925

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

Table 6: Term limits, wealth, and climate IEAs, 1992-2011

	DV: Climate IEAs signed	
	<i>OLS</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	−0.078 (0.067)	−0.016 (0.093)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.008 (0.006)	0.046 (0.032)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	−0.0001 (0.0001)	−0.001 (0.002)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.010 (0.006)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.0003 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.002)
XRCOMP	0.009 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)
PARCOMP	−0.011* (0.006)	−0.014 (0.009)
IGO memberships	0.00004 (0.0003)	0.002** (0.001)
Executive right	0.004 (0.011)	−0.003 (0.013)
Executive left	0.003 (0.011)	−0.005 (0.013)
CSO repression	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.013)
Presidential democracy?	−0.014 (0.010)	−0.008 (0.011)
Leader age	−0.001 (0.0004)	−0.001* (0.001)
Female	−0.010 (0.014)	−0.028 (0.023)
Term limit × Real GDP/capita	0.010 (0.008)	0.001 (0.012)
Country dummies?	N	Y
Observations	1,600	1,600
R ²	0.928	0.932
Adjusted R ²	0.926	0.925

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

D Alternate dependent variable: Domestic climate policies

Table 7: Term limits and domestic climate policies, 2000-2011

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	<i>OLS</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	−0.017 (0.015)	−0.024 (0.023)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.00002 (0.007)	−0.012 (0.095)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Experience with democracy	0.001** (0.001)	0.019 (0.022)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.011)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
XRCOMP	−0.063*** (0.016)	−0.009 (0.017)
PARCOMP	0.026** (0.011)	0.002 (0.018)
IGO memberships	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.005)
Executive right	−0.016 (0.021)	−0.042 (0.029)
Executive left	0.036* (0.019)	−0.010 (0.019)
CSO repression	0.006 (0.010)	0.013 (0.021)
Presidential democracy	0.010 (0.025)	0.048 (0.038)
Leader age	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.002)
Female	−0.021 (0.037)	0.108 (0.071)
Country dummies?	N	Y
Observations	891	891
R ²	0.153	0.324
Adjusted R ²	0.127	0.227

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

Table 8: Term limits, wealth, and domestic climate policies, 2000-2011

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	<i>OLS</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	0.205* (0.118)	0.240 (0.188)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.008 (0.010)	0.006 (0.098)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Experience with democracy	0.001** (0.001)	0.012 (0.024)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.011)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
XRCOMP	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)
PARCOMP	0.025** (0.011)	0.001 (0.018)
IGO memberships	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.005)
Executive right	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.041 (0.029)
Executive left	0.035* (0.019)	-0.008 (0.019)
CSO repression	0.003 (0.010)	0.012 (0.021)
Presidential democracy	0.014 (0.025)	0.046 (0.038)
Leader age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Female	-0.019 (0.037)	0.107 (0.072)
Term limit \times Real GDP/capita	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.031 (0.024)
Country dummies?	N	Y
Observations	891	891
R ²	0.154	0.325
Adjusted R ²	0.128	0.227

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

E Table output for World Bank income classification as moderator variable

Table 9: Term limits and environmental treaty participation with World Bank income classification as moderator, 1970-2011

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	MEAs	MEAs + BEAs
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	0.172 (0.326)	0.161 (0.412)
Lower-middle income group	0.050 (0.255)	0.261 (0.322)
Upper-middle income group	-0.034 (0.338)	0.050 (0.427)
High income group	-0.256 (0.483)	-0.394 (0.610)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
Experience with democracy	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.074* (0.042)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	-0.088 (0.062)	-0.202*** (0.078)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.058*** (0.019)	0.066*** (0.023)
XRCOMP	0.420** (0.191)	0.464* (0.241)
PARCOMP	-0.048 (0.107)	-0.127 (0.134)
IGO memberships	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.031** (0.015)
Executive right	0.107 (0.154)	-0.001 (0.194)
Executive left	0.033 (0.154)	0.006 (0.194)
CSO repression	0.130 (0.112)	0.156 (0.142)
Presidential democracy?	0.080 (0.121)	-0.007 (0.153)
Leader age	0.0003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)
Female	-0.313 (0.214)	-0.500* (0.271)
Term limit × Lower-middle income	-0.451 (0.392)	-0.299 (0.494)
Term limit × Upper-middle income	-1.151** (0.511)	-1.384** (0.647)
Term limit × High income	-1.420*** (0.526)	-1.691** (0.664)
Country dummies?	Y	Y
Observations	1,847	1,847
R ²	0.973	0.964
Adjusted R ²	0.971	0.961

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

F Bivariate regressions

Table 10: Term limits and environmental treaty participation, 1970-2011 (bivariate)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	<i>OLS</i> MEAs	<i>OLS</i> MEAs + BEAs
	(1)	(2)
Term limit	-0.939*** (0.268)	-1.216*** (0.304)
Constant	8.033*** (0.096)	8.833*** (0.108)
Observations	2,755	2,755
R ²	0.004	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.005

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.

G Ratification models

Table 11: Term limits and environmental treaty ratification, 1970-2011

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>OLS</i>		<i>OLS</i>	
	MEAs (1)	MEAs (2)	MEAs + BEAs (3)	MEAs + BEAs (4)
Term limit	−0.220* (0.130)	−0.247 (0.194)	−0.218* (0.130)	−0.247 (0.194)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.232*** (0.063)	0.250 (0.253)	0.234*** (0.064)	0.242 (0.252)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Experience with democracy	−0.007*** (0.002)	0.023 (0.026)	−0.007*** (0.002)	0.023 (0.026)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	−0.170*** (0.046)	−0.174** (0.074)	−0.168*** (0.046)	−0.176** (0.074)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	−0.022*** (0.008)	−0.024 (0.017)	−0.022*** (0.008)	−0.024 (0.017)
XRCOMP	0.257* (0.141)	0.447** (0.210)	0.254* (0.141)	0.444** (0.210)
PARCOMP	0.199*** (0.073)	0.266*** (0.102)	0.201*** (0.073)	0.265*** (0.102)
IGO memberships	0.015*** (0.004)	0.026** (0.013)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.026** (0.013)
Executive right	−0.126 (0.128)	0.006 (0.183)	−0.131 (0.128)	−0.002 (0.183)
Executive left	−0.075 (0.132)	−0.158 (0.176)	−0.073 (0.132)	−0.160 (0.176)
CSO repression	0.128** (0.061)	0.119 (0.100)	0.128** (0.061)	0.119 (0.100)
Presidential democracy?	0.172 (0.137)	0.154 (0.149)	0.170 (0.137)	0.151 (0.149)
Leader age	−0.014*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	−0.014*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
Female	−0.236 (0.190)	−0.366 (0.235)	−0.242 (0.190)	−0.373 (0.235)
Country dummies?	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274
R ²	0.616	0.661	0.617	0.661
Adjusted R ²	0.607	0.636	0.608	0.636

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included where indicated but omitted from table output.

H Distribution of environmental subjects covered in treaties




Figure 5: Distribution of subjects covered in treaties

I Limiting sample to Cheibub et al. democracies

Table 12: Limiting Table 2 sample to list of democracies in Cheibub et al. (2010)

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS		OLS		Poisson		Poisson	
	MEAs (1)	MEAs (2)	MEAs + BEAs (3)	MEAs + BEAs (4)	MEAs (5)	MEAs (6)	MEAs + BEAs (7)	MEAs + BEAs (8)
Term limit	-0.376** (0.155)	-0.370* (0.204)	-0.382** (0.185)	-0.411 (0.255)	-0.046** (0.020)	-0.041* (0.025)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.040 (0.031)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.481*** (0.071)	-0.171 (0.245)	0.525*** (0.088)	-0.542* (0.299)	0.068*** (0.010)	-0.082** (0.038)	0.078*** (0.011)	-0.120*** (0.044)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0005 (0.0003)	0.00000 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.041 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.074** (0.031)	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.011* (0.005)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	-0.128*** (0.049)	-0.138** (0.062)	0.030 (0.066)	-0.243** (0.109)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.010)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	-0.021** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.068*** (0.021)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)
XRCOMP	0.475*** (0.157)	0.437** (0.202)	0.381** (0.179)	0.486** (0.225)	0.077*** (0.023)	0.053* (0.028)	0.075*** (0.024)	0.055* (0.030)
PARCOMP	0.127 (0.081)	-0.225** (0.100)	0.014 (0.090)	-0.294** (0.118)	0.017 (0.011)	-0.031* (0.016)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.039** (0.018)
IGO memberships	0.032*** (0.004)	0.009 (0.011)	0.026*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Executive right	-0.116 (0.126)	0.152 (0.135)	-0.080 (0.145)	0.022 (0.169)	-0.012 (0.015)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.018)
Executive left	-0.140 (0.127)	0.120 (0.136)	-0.084 (0.153)	0.044 (0.167)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.020)
CSO repression	0.280*** (0.064)	0.039 (0.093)	0.306*** (0.079)	0.100 (0.115)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.024* (0.014)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.038** (0.017)
Presidential democracy	0.165 (0.114)	-0.040 (0.429)	0.314** (0.150)	0.278 (0.438)	0.027** (0.014)	0.033 (0.054)	0.044*** (0.016)	0.064 (0.054)
Leader age	-0.006 (0.005)	0.0004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.00000 (0.001)
Female	0.011 (0.189)	-0.102 (0.221)	-0.131 (0.214)	-0.209 (0.288)	0.007 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.029)
Country dummies?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869
R ²	0.960	0.972	0.948	0.961				
Adjusted R ²	0.959	0.970	0.947	0.958				
Log Likelihood					-4,108.270	-3,933.345	-4,358.896	-4,171.067
Akaike Inf. Crit.					8,316.541	8,150.689	8,817.791	8,626.134

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

Table 13: Limiting Table 2 sample to list of democracies in Cheibub et al. (2010)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Poisson</i>
	MEAs	MEAs	MEAs + BEAs	MEAs + BEAs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Term limit	4.529*** (1.304)	0.371** (0.175)	4.898*** (1.740)	0.356 (0.221)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.037 (0.251)	−0.066* (0.038)	−0.321 (0.308)	−0.105** (0.045)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.0004 (0.002)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.001)	−0.00003 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	−0.043 (0.026)	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.076** (0.031)	−0.011** (0.005)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	−0.142** (0.061)	−0.016** (0.007)	−0.249** (0.109)	−0.028*** (0.010)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.006** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.021)	0.007** (0.003)
XRCOMP	0.476** (0.201)	0.055* (0.028)	0.530** (0.225)	0.057* (0.030)
PARCOMP	−0.242** (0.100)	−0.032** (0.016)	−0.314*** (0.118)	−0.040** (0.018)
IGO memberships	0.012 (0.012)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.014)	−0.002* (0.001)
Executive right	0.134 (0.136)	0.013 (0.016)	0.002 (0.169)	−0.005 (0.018)
Executive left	0.106 (0.136)	−0.007 (0.016)	0.029 (0.168)	−0.022 (0.020)
CSO repression	−0.003 (0.093)	0.021 (0.014)	0.055 (0.116)	0.035** (0.017)
Presidential democracy	−0.032 (0.437)	0.036 (0.054)	0.292 (0.446)	0.066 (0.054)
Leader age	0.001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.007)	0.0001 (0.001)
Female	−0.072 (0.220)	−0.010 (0.026)	−0.177 (0.288)	−0.011 (0.029)
Term limit × Real GDP/capita	−0.573*** (0.151)	−0.047** (0.020)	−0.621*** (0.210)	−0.045* (0.026)
Observations	1,869	1,869	1,869	1,869
R ²	0.972		0.961	
Adjusted R ²	0.970		0.958	
Log Likelihood		−3,932.247		−4,169.907
Akaike Inf. Crit.		8,150.494		8,625.815

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

J Excluding treaties with reservations from the sample

Table 14: Models in Table 2 excluding treaties with reservations

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS		OLS		Poisson		Poisson	
	MEAs (1)	MEAs (2)	MEAs + BEAs (3)	MEAs + BEAs (4)	MEAs (5)	MEAs (6)	MEAs + BEAs (7)	MEAs + BEAs (8)
Term limit	-0.281** (0.127)	-0.144 (0.161)	-0.270* (0.145)	-0.231 (0.201)	-0.027 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.028 (0.028)
Real GDP/capita (log)	0.412*** (0.058)	-0.261 (0.218)	0.464*** (0.073)	-0.453* (0.252)	0.066*** (0.009)	-0.022 (0.034)	0.079*** (0.011)	-0.050 (0.041)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.006** (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.00002 (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.053** (0.024)	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.0005* (0.0003)	-0.008** (0.004)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	-0.083** (0.041)	-0.114** (0.053)	0.070 (0.057)	-0.220** (0.096)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.010)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.002 (0.008)	0.049*** (0.016)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005** (0.003)
XRCOMP	0.593*** (0.125)	0.292* (0.173)	0.423*** (0.142)	0.328* (0.194)	0.124*** (0.021)	0.045* (0.027)	0.115*** (0.023)	0.047* (0.028)
PARCOMP	0.189*** (0.070)	-0.172* (0.090)	0.117 (0.078)	-0.234** (0.104)	0.023** (0.011)	-0.038*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.045*** (0.016)
IGO memberships	0.030*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.009)	0.026*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Executive right	-0.170 (0.107)	0.093 (0.115)	-0.163 (0.125)	-0.020 (0.148)	-0.023 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.018)
Executive left	-0.118 (0.104)	0.038 (0.114)	-0.106 (0.127)	-0.040 (0.145)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)
CSO repression	0.137*** (0.052)	0.066 (0.077)	0.134** (0.064)	0.094 (0.098)	0.024*** (0.008)	0.024* (0.013)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.034** (0.015)
Presidential democracy?	0.164 (0.114)	-0.008 (0.102)	0.142 (0.139)	-0.123 (0.131)	0.025 (0.016)	0.001 (0.013)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.017)
Leader age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.0001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.00003 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Female	0.004 (0.153)	-0.167 (0.174)	-0.115 (0.184)	-0.318 (0.251)	0.014 (0.022)	0.003 (0.023)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.028)
Country dummies?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274
R ²	0.954	0.968	0.940	0.956				
Adjusted R ²	0.953	0.966	0.939	0.952				
Log Likelihood					-4,843.142	-4,594.719	-5,161.871	-4,887.761
Akaike Inf. Crit.					9,790.283	9,505.437	10,427.740	10,091.520

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

Table 15: Models in Table 3 excluding treaties with reservations

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Poisson</i>
	MEAs	MEAs	MEAs + BEAs	MEAs + BEAs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Term limit	3.256*** (0.976)	0.412*** (0.143)	3.625*** (1.351)	0.403** (0.191)
Real GDP/capita (log)	−0.154 (0.223)	−0.007 (0.035)	−0.334 (0.258)	−0.036 (0.041)
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.)	0.002 (0.002)	−0.00005 (0.0003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Experience with democracy	−0.033 (0.021)	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.058** (0.024)	−0.009** (0.004)
Disasters in prior 3 years (log)	−0.117** (0.053)	−0.016** (0.007)	−0.224** (0.096)	−0.030*** (0.010)
Resource rents (pct. of GDP)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.005** (0.002)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.005** (0.003)
XRCOMP	0.322* (0.173)	0.049* (0.027)	0.363* (0.195)	0.050* (0.028)
PARCOMP	−0.180** (0.091)	−0.039*** (0.014)	−0.245** (0.105)	−0.046*** (0.016)
IGO memberships	0.009 (0.010)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.003 (0.012)	−0.002* (0.001)
Executive right	0.086 (0.115)	0.013 (0.015)	−0.029 (0.148)	−0.002 (0.018)
Executive left	0.031 (0.114)	−0.008 (0.015)	−0.047 (0.145)	−0.022 (0.018)
CSO repression	0.039 (0.077)	0.021* (0.013)	0.064 (0.098)	0.031** (0.015)
Presidential democracy?	−0.015 (0.101)	−0.00000 (0.013)	−0.131 (0.130)	−0.017 (0.017)
Leader age	−0.00000 (0.004)	−0.0005 (0.001)	0.003 (0.005)	0.0001 (0.001)
Female	−0.138 (0.173)	0.007 (0.023)	−0.286 (0.251)	0.003 (0.028)
Term limit × Real GDP/capita	−0.405*** (0.116)	−0.050*** (0.016)	−0.459*** (0.166)	−0.050** (0.023)
Observations	2,274	2,274	2,274	2,274
R ²	0.968		0.956	
Adjusted R ²	0.966		0.953	
Log Likelihood		−4,593.184		−4,885.994
Akaike Inf. Crit.		9,504.368		10,089.990

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses.

Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output.

K Testing conditional effects of political competition

Below we report the estimated coefficients for term limits using dichotomous versions of the Polity projects *xrcomp* and *parcomp* variables that take a value of 1 when a country-year scores the most competitive score on each respective measure and 0 otherwise. We include country and year dummies in all of the models along with all of the other covariates included in Tables 2 and 3 in the main text. The plots display point estimates with 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 6: Conditional effects of political competition