Limiting Table 2 sample to list of democracies in Cheibub et al. (2010)
|
| Dependent variable: |
| |
| OLS | OLS | Poisson | Poisson |
| MEAs | MEAs | MEAs + BEAs | MEAs + BEAs | MEAs | MEAs | MEAs + BEAs | MEAs + BEAs |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|
Term limit | -0.376** | -0.370* | -0.382** | -0.411 | -0.046** | -0.041* | -0.045** | -0.040 |
| (0.155) | (0.204) | (0.185) | (0.255) | (0.020) | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.031) |
Real GDP/capita (log) | 0.481*** | -0.171 | 0.525*** | -0.542* | 0.068*** | -0.082** | 0.078*** | -0.120*** |
| (0.071) | (0.245) | (0.088) | (0.299) | (0.010) | (0.038) | (0.011) | (0.044) |
Change in real GDP/capita (pct.) | 0.004** | 0.001 | 0.006*** | 0.002 | 0.0002 | -0.0002 | 0.0005 | 0.00000 |
| (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.0004) | (0.0004) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) |
Experience with democracy | -0.007*** | -0.041 | -0.003 | -0.074** | -0.001*** | -0.006 | -0.0003 | -0.011* |
| (0.002) | (0.027) | (0.003) | (0.031) | (0.0002) | (0.005) | (0.0003) | (0.005) |
Disasters in prior 3 years (log) | -0.128*** | -0.138** | 0.030 | -0.243** | -0.012** | -0.016** | 0.007 | -0.028*** |
| (0.049) | (0.062) | (0.066) | (0.109) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
Resource rents (pct. of GDP) | -0.021** | 0.060*** | -0.013 | 0.068*** | -0.006*** | 0.006** | -0.005*** | 0.007** |
| (0.010) | (0.019) | (0.011) | (0.021) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) |
XRCOMP | 0.475*** | 0.437** | 0.381** | 0.486** | 0.077*** | 0.053* | 0.075*** | 0.055* |
| (0.157) | (0.202) | (0.179) | (0.225) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.030) |
PARCOMP | 0.127 | -0.225** | 0.014 | -0.294** | 0.017 | -0.031* | 0.001 | -0.039** |
| (0.081) | (0.100) | (0.090) | (0.118) | (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.018) |
IGO memberships | 0.032*** | 0.009 | 0.026*** | -0.004 | 0.003*** | -0.001 | 0.002*** | -0.003* |
| (0.004) | (0.011) | (0.005) | (0.014) | (0.0004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
Executive right | -0.116 | 0.152 | -0.080 | 0.022 | -0.012 | 0.014 | -0.005 | -0.004 |
| (0.126) | (0.135) | (0.145) | (0.169) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.018) |
Executive left | -0.140 | 0.120 | -0.084 | 0.044 | -0.025 | -0.006 | -0.021 | -0.021 |
| (0.127) | (0.136) | (0.153) | (0.167) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.020) |
CSO repression | 0.280*** | 0.039 | 0.306*** | 0.100 | 0.042*** | 0.024* | 0.045*** | 0.038** |
| (0.064) | (0.093) | (0.079) | (0.115) | (0.009) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.017) |
Presidential democracy | 0.165 | -0.040 | 0.314** | 0.278 | 0.027** | 0.033 | 0.044*** | 0.064 |
| (0.114) | (0.429) | (0.150) | (0.438) | (0.014) | (0.054) | (0.016) | (0.054) |
Leader age | -0.006 | 0.0004 | -0.001 | 0.004 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.0003 | -0.00000 |
| (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
Female | 0.011 | -0.102 | -0.131 | -0.209 | 0.007 | -0.012 | -0.007 | -0.013 |
| (0.189) | (0.221) | (0.214) | (0.288) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.029) |
|
Country dummies? | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y |
Observations | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 | 1,869 |
R2 | 0.960 | 0.972 | 0.948 | 0.961 | | | | |
Adjusted R2 | 0.959 | 0.970 | 0.947 | 0.958 | | | | |
Log Likelihood | | | | | -4,108.270 | -3,933.345 | -4,358.896 | -4,171.067 |
Akaike Inf. Crit. | | | | | 8,316.541 | 8,150.689 | 8,817.791 | 8,626.134 |
|
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |
Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses. |
Country- and year dummies included but omitted from table output. |